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Idea of the paper
Two countries/regions differently affected by & differently
responsible for an environmental stock externality.
A cooperative agreement on emissions reduction.
Goal of the paper: propose a sharing mechanism that
guarantees cooperation (time consistency of the agreement).
with two properties:
1 A benefit-pay-principle: the greater the benefit from
cooperation, the greater must be share of the cost.
2 A responsibility axiom: the higher its responsibility, the greater
must be share of the cost.
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For example ...
Rise in temperatures caused by global warming: Northern
colder regions vs. countries with warmer climate.
Agreement to mitigate the environmental problem (reduce
greenhouse gas emissions) within [0, T ], each region would be
differently benefited.
Countries have different responsibility for the state of the
environment (CO2 concentration ).
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A simple formulation
The maximization under the cooperative agreement reads:
max
E1,E2
2∑
i=1{∫ T0 w(Ei(τ))e−ρτdτ − e−ρTDi(PC(T ))} ,
s.t.: P˙ = Ei +E−i − δP, P (0) = P0,
Countries have:
identical instantaneous profits from emissions
wi(Ei) = w(Ei),
different damage from global warming, collected by the scrap
values −Di(PC(T )), with (Di)′(P ) > 0.
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A simple formulation
If cooperation halts, at t, a non-cooperative game from t till T .
Each player solves:
max
Ei
∫ T
t
w(Ei(τ))e−ρ(τ−t)dτ − e−ρ(T−t)Di(PN(t;T )),
s.t.: P˙ = Ei +E−i − δP, Pt = PC(t).
Non-cooperative game starting at time t, for τ ∈ [t, T ]:
EiN(τ ; t): Feedback NE, optimal non-cooperative emissions
PN(τ ; t): Optimal pollution stock path under the NE.
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On time consistency
At time t ∈ [0, T ) shall players maintain cooperation?
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PN(T ; t)PN(τ ; t)
W iC(t)=∫ T
t
w(EiC(τ))e−ρ(τ−t)dτ − Di(PC(T ))e−ρ(T−t)
W iN(t)=∫ T
t
w(EiN(τ, t))e−ρ(τ−t)dτ − Di(PN(T ; t))e−ρ(T−t)
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On time consistency
At T : Absolute gains from cooperation from t to T .
Bi(t) ≡ [Di(PN(T ; t)) −Di(PC(T ))]e−ρ(T−t).
Within [t, T ): Cost of (contribution to) cooperation:
Ci(t) = ∫ T
t
w(EiC(τ))e−ρ(τ−t)dτ −∫ T
t
w(EiN(τ, t))e−ρ(τ−t)dτ.
Assumption 1: A positive global surplus to go: gap between total
costs and total benefits.
S(t) = 2∑
i=1 (Ci(t) +Bi(t)) ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
8 / 22
The time consistent imputation distribution
procedure
Define an IDP pii(t) to distribute the cooperative payoffs obtained
within the interval [0, T ) in such a way both players prefer to
follow the cooperative behavior when:
1 Cooperation represents a cost within the cooperative period.
2 Benefits from cooperation comes at the end of this period.
3 These benefits are asymmetric among regions.
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The time consistent imputation distribution
procedure
Let pii(t) be a payoff distribution procedure.
Definition 1
Given pii(τ), the payoff to go for player i from t on reads:
W ipi(t) = ∫ T
t
pii(τ)e−ρ(τ−t)dτ −Di(PC(T ))e−ρ(T−t).
This IDP is time consistent under condition:
W ipi(t) =W iN(t) + φi(t)S(t) ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
with φi(t) a differentiable function satisfying:
φi(t) ∈ [0,1] and φi(t) + φ−i(t) = 1 ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
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The time consistent imputation distribution
procedure
Proposition 1
Consider φi(t) any differentiable function satisfying φi(t) ∈ [0,1]
and φi(t) + φ−i(t) = 1 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
pii(t)=wiN(t)+φi(t)s(t)−(φi)′(t)S(t)+φi(t)Θ−iN (t)−φ−i(t)ΘiN(t),
with s(t) = wiC(t) +w−iC (t) −wiN(t; t) −w−iN (t; t) and
ΘiN(t)=∫ T
t
w˙iN(τ ; t)e−ρ(τ−t)dτ−(Di)′(PN(T ; t))P˙N(T ; t)e−ρ(T−t).
pii(t) + pi−i(t) = wiC(t) +w−iC (t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
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Transfer Schemes for Time Consistency
Standard approach:
1 Choose a bargaining approach (NBS, Shapley, Core...) and its
corresponding solution
2 Compute the benchmark payoff i.e., the non cooperative
solution
3 Decompose over time the total individual cooperative payoffs
according to the chosen bargaining approach and subject to
the satisfaction of the condition of time consistency.
φi(t) depends on the chosen bargaining approach.
For example, for the Nash bargaining solution: φi = 1/2.
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How to define φ(t)
In this paper we do not choose a particular bargaining approach.
We try to define the sharing rule, φi(t), so that the IDP verifies
some axioms:
1 Time consistency
2 Benefits-pay-principle (BPP)
3 Polluter-pay-principle (PPP)- Responsibility
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How to define φ(t)
Gains from cooperation:
Bi(t) =Di(PN(T ; t)) −Di(PC(T )) cannot be distributed.
Contribution to cooperation of region i within [t, T ):
Cipi(t) = ∫ T
t
[wiN(τ) − pii(τ)]e−ρ(τ−t)dτ.
1 Different valuation of a less polluted environment:
Bˆi(t) ≡ Bi(t)
B(t) > B−i(t)B(t) ≡ Bˆ−i(t).
2 Different responsibility from past emissions:
Ri = riD−i(P0) − r−iDi(P0)
Di(P0) +D−i(P0) = ri − Dˆi(P0) = −R−i.
with ri the % of all past emissions accrued to region i.
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Axioms
Axiom 1: Benefits-pay-principle (BPP)
The greater Bˆi(t) the greater must be Cˆipi(t).
∂Cˆipi(t)
∂Bˆi(t) ∣B(t)=Cte > 0.
Axiom 2: Responsibility with respect to past emissions (PPP)
The greater Ri the greater must be Cˆipi(t).
∂Cˆipi(t)
∂Ri
> 0.
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Proposition of a value for φi(t)
Define φi(t) as:
φi(t) = Bˆi(t) − αRi.
φi is a combination between the valuation of a less polluted
environment and the responsibility from past emissions.
Conditions φi(t) + φ−i(t) = 1 and φi(t) ∈ [0,1], ∀t ∈ [0, T ], imply:
α ≤ max{Bˆ1
R1
,
Bˆ2
R2
} ≡ αmax.
The sharing rule satisfies:
1 Axiom 1 Benefits-pay-principle.
2 Axiom 2 Responsibility with respect to past emissions.
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Egalitarian rule, φi(t) = 1/2
Defining φi(t) as:
φi(t) = Bˆi(t) − αRi.
∂φi
∂Bˆi
> 0, ∂φi
∂Ri
< 0.
if Bˆi(t) > 1/2 and Ri < 0 (R−i > 0) then
φi(t) > 1
2
, φ−i(t) < 1
2
, ∀α ∈ [0, αmax].
Proposition 2
If the region which benefits most from the agreement is less
responsible from past emissions the proposed IDP never leads to
the egualitarian rule regardless of α.
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Example: Bˆ1(t) < Bˆ2(t), R1 > 0.
A Linear-Quadratic example:
w(E) = aE − E2
2
, Di = di1P 2(T ),
a = 1, d1 = 0.07, d2 = 0.11, r1 = .72, (r2 = .28), δ = .1, P0 = 1, ρ = .03.
Region 2 higher relative gains:
Bˆ1 = 0.07
0.18
= 0.39 < Bˆ2 = 0.18
0.1
= 0.61
Region 1 higher responsibility:
R1 = r1 − Dˆ1(P0) = 0.33 > 0, R2 = r2 − Dˆ2(P0) = −0.33 < 0
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Example: Bˆ1(t) < Bˆ2(t), R1 > 0, R2 < 0.
Simplifying assumptions:
Relative damage Dˆi(P ) is independent of P .
φ1(t) = 0.39−0.33α, φ2(t) = 0.61+0.33α not time dependent.
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Example: Bˆ1(t) < Bˆ2(t), R1 > 0, R2 < 0.
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Example: Bˆ1(t) < Bˆ2(t), R1 > 0, R2 < 0.
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Conclusion and extensions
...to summarize
This paper propose a time consistent sharing mechanism
satisfying three properties:
1 the agreement is time consistent,
2 the greater the benefit one country gets from cooperation, the
greater is its share of the burden,
3 the higher is its responsibility, the strongly must be the burden.
Our proposal does not include the egalitarian rule.
Particularize for a concrete example.
to be done...
Can we find other φi?
Our definition of φi has a free parameter α. Can we impose
additional axioms?
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